Georgia State University

ScholarWorks @ Georgia State University
ECON Publications

Department of Economics

2014

A Retrospective on Taxation in Developing Countries: Will the
Weakest Link Be Strengthened?
Roy W. Bahl
Georgia State University, rbahl@gsu.edu

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarworks.gsu.edu/econ_facpub
Part of the Economics Commons

Recommended Citation
Bahl, Roy W. "A Retrospective on Taxation in Developing Countries: Will the Weakest Link Be
Strengthened?" in Taxation and Development: The Weakest Link, Essays in Honor of Roy Bahl, edited by
Richard Bird and Jorge Martinez-Vazquez, (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar) 2014. https://doi.org/10.4337/
9781783474332.

This Book Chapter is brought to you for free and open access by the Department of Economics at ScholarWorks @
Georgia State University. It has been accepted for inclusion in ECON Publications by an authorized administrator of
ScholarWorks @ Georgia State University. For more information, please contact scholarworks@gsu.edu.

JOBNAME: Bird PAGE: 3 SESS: 8 OUTPUT: Mon Aug 18 09:34:10 2014

12. A retrospective on taxation in
developing countries: Will the
weakest link be strengthened?1
Roy Bahl

Copyright © 2014. Edward Elgar Publishing Limited. All rights reserved.

INTRODUCTION
Nicholas Kaldor told us in 1963 that developing countries did not know
how to tax, Richard Goode told us in 1984 that they still had trouble
formulating and implementing tax policies, and Richard Bird tells us in
2011 that tax design and tax administration in developing countries have
shown considerable improvement but there is a long way to go before
taxation can properly support growth and distribution objectives. All
three got it right for the time period they were studying. Some middle
income countries have been closing the gap with the industrials in
revenue mobilization, good tax policy and efficient administration, but
the convergence in most low income countries has been much slower.
It is not an exaggeration to say that taxation is a weak link in the
development policies of low income countries. In many countries,
revenues are not large enough to provide a basic level of services or to
develop infrastructure on which to build an economy that can capture its
comparative advantages. Tax bases are narrow because of legal exemptions, poor enforcement, and hard-to-tax economies. This leads to a
misallocation of resources that retards growth, perhaps to a significant
extent, and to horizontal inequities that erode confidence in the tax
system and encourage noncompliance. It is true enough that taxation is
especially difficult in poor countries where both the capacity to pay and
the capacity to collect are limited. But it is also the case that taxable
capacity has grown, even in poor countries, and the path to better tax
policy and administration has been more or less well learned. Why then
have we not seen more improvements in the tax systems in poor
countries?
405
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This chapter is about revenue mobilization and tax structure changes in
developing countries since the 1970s, the factors underlying this pattern,
and what this history suggests for the future. Several distinguished
students of taxation have studied this set of questions for different
periods of time (Chelliah, 1971, Tanzi, 1987, Bird, 2011a) and their
conclusions are more or less in step with those reached here. But the
longer time horizon of this study and the different take on some of the
questions about the poor tax performance in developing countries may
add some new value.2
In the next section of this chapter, the evidence on long run changes in
revenue mobilization is reviewed, and some explanations for the relatively weak performance in many low income countries are offered. We
turn then to the same question for changes in the tax structures. The
general conclusions reached here are that the rate of taxation in low
income countries has not risen appreciably faster than GDP over this
period, that countries have ignored the advice to broaden the tax base as
often as they have acted on it, and that administrative improvements have
been slow to come on line. The culprits in all of this have been a slow
process of economic modernization, too little investment in the tax
administration infrastructure and too little commitment to enforcement,
and a political economy that often seems rigged against both more
taxation and good taxation. Later in the chapter, I suggest that there are
underlying factors that might cause this pattern to change during the next
decade, and bring about more convergence in tax practices between
developing and industrial countries. A final section concludes.
The discussion in this chapter is limited to taxation in developing
countries. I do not take up user charges or other non-tax revenues, nor do
I address the important question of revenue mobilization from natural
resources. Tax reform in transition countries is another very interesting
study (Bahl, 1999, and Martinez-Vazquez, Rider and Wallace, 2008), but
also too different to do justice to it here.

REVENUE MOBILIZATION
There is no one correct answer to the normative question about the
percent of total output that ought to be diverted to government purposes
through the tax system. It depends on the scope of responsibilities that is
taken on by the public sector, the degree to which non-tax sources of
revenue are used to finance the delivery of these services, on the costs
of taxation and the benefits of expenditures, and on how the trade-off
between growth and redistribution is viewed. Though growth models that
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treat taxation as endogenous may ultimately lead us to an answer on a
country-by-country basis, we are not there yet.3
Anyway, the question is more complicated than economics. The “right”
level of taxation also depends on culture and on the views of voters and
political leaders about the role of the state. The right level of taxation in
the eyes of a Jamaican or a Dane will be very different from that seen
through the eyes of a Guatemalan or an American. Tax evasion in one
country might be a scarlet letter, but in another it might be a badge of
honor. Two things we can count on in developing countries, however, are
that taxpaying voters will feel overtaxed, and external advisers will see
the level of taxes as too low.
Earlier tax reform studies took on the question of the “right” level of
revenue mobilization, but from an economic growth perspective. The
Musgrave Commission in Colombia derived a revenue gap from the
projections of savings and investment necessary to achieve a target
growth rate (Musgrave and Gillis, 1971, Goode, 1993). But few earlier
studies started with expenditure needs in setting a revenue target. After
the 1980s, most tax studies finessed the normative question. If the
government asked the normative question, “How much should we tax”,
the (correct) response from the head of the study team was “how much
do you want to spend”. This usually led to a revenue neutral approach in
the tax study, i.e., to raise the same amount of revenue as does the
present tax system, but in a more efficient and fairer way, and then leave
it to the politicians to decide on how much they want to tax this improved
base. While all of this is nicely said, and allows the bigger question to be
swept under the rug, in the end the tax study usually comes back to
making estimates of revenue enhancements that will accompany the
structural reform.
Those who do research on the level of taxation in developing countries
have more often raised the positive question, i.e., what share of GDP is
taken by taxes? This question does have an answer and can be used as a
basis for comparison: on average in the 2000s, tax revenues are equivalent to about 16 percent of GDP in developing countries, a level that is
well below that in industrial countries. To the extent there is comfort in
averages, this approach has given governments some useful benchmarks
and it has led to a large research effort, but still we are without an answer
to the normative question.
Empirical Evidence
Comparing tax performance among developing countries is no easy
matter. The best comparable data for developing countries are from the
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IMF database (International Monetary Fund, 2010), but there are problems with these data, and these problems can compromise the findings of
empirical work. In particular, tax revenue data are not reported for
several countries and this makes both time series and cross-section
comparisons hazardous (see Box 12.1).
Table 12.1 Tax revenues as a percent of GDP in developing countries
Decade

Average Percent

1970s
1980s
1990s
2000s
Note:

14.8
17.0
16.9
16.0
Includes social security taxes.

Source: IMF (2010), with selected countries deleted from the series because of data
problems (see Box 12.1).

BOX 12.1

The ratio of tax revenue collections to GDP is the indicator of
the level of taxation used in most comparative studies. But
there are important limitations on how this measure can be
used in comparative analyses. It excludes non-tax revenues
such as user charges, so it will less accurately reflect the
total revenue mobilization for public uses than it will reflect
the choice of a financing method. It also does not make
adjustment for inter-country differences in the scope of government, i.e., for the choice to deliver a service through
government or through the private sector, or for different rates
of nationalization of key industries.
Matters are further complicated by several measurement
issues. The only comprehensive database that allows international comparison of all countries is the International
Monetary Fund’s Government Finance Statistics (2010). However, there are shortcomings in these data. Among these
shortcomings are missing data for some countries for some
years, some debatable dis-aggregation by type of tax, the
failure to report all subnational government revenues, and a
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change in the classification of taxes that makes it impossible
to exactly compare tax structures before and after 1990
(Martinez-Vazquez, Vulovic, and Liu, 2011; Ebel and Yilmaz,
2003). Still, the IMF data offer the best comparative fiscal
information, and should provide a reasonably accurate picture of changes in total tax revenue mobilization and changes
in broad categories of tax structure. With all of these caveats
in mind, the results presented in this chapter are based on
these data.

The results reported in Table 12.1 show decade averages for the 1970s,
1980s, 1990s and 2000s.4, 5 These results show that tax revenues rose by
only about one percent of GDP over these four decades, from 14.8
percent in the 1970s to 16 percent in the 2000s. This finding is roughly
comparable to that of the IMF (2011) which supplemented the GFS
database with information gathered by other agencies and with their own
country reports. The results from similar analyses for earlier periods (but
still using IMF data) were not very different (Burgess and Stern, 1992;
Tanzi, 1987; Bahl, 2006).
What to make of this finding? One impressionistic reaction is that
holding revenues at a level as low as 16–17 percent of GDP over a 40
year time period did not enable the financing of an adequate level of
government services. This proposition is not a new one. Adolph Wagner,
writing at the turn of the 20th century, used data on the expenditures of
European countries to argue that the normal course of things is for
government expenditures to rise proportionately faster than total output.6
The “right” growth of course will depend on the long run income and
price elasticities of demand for government expenditures, but Wagner’s
guess, based on the performance of European countries, was that this will
surely be greater than unity. Wagner’s “law” does square with the
increasing tax ratio observed in industrial countries since the 1950s
(Pryor, 1985, Tanzi, 2011).
We might expect the same pattern from developing countries as they
graduate to higher levels of development. A tax revenue growth roughly
equivalent to that of GDP (as found here) was used to maintain the
present level of services (pay salaries, cover running costs, maintain
capital assets, etc.), repay debt, deal with emergencies, and to provide
some upgrades to services and infrastructure. The lower the tax ratio, the
less has been available for upgrades. User charges and other non-tax
revenues, and foreign aid, may have provided additional resources to
cover some of this financing gap, but this has varied from country to
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country. The more likely scenario is that the infrastructure gap and the
shortfall in the quality of public expenditures have continued to grow.
The situation in India might illustrate the point. The ratio of taxes to
GDP averaged 12.8 percent in the 1970s but rose to 13.6 percent in the
2000s. A government-appointed commission recently estimated that the
needed increase in urban infrastructure investment and maintenance
expenditures to cover the existing gap is equivalent to 1.1 percent of GDP
per year (High Powered Expert Committee, 2011). Neither recurrent
public service needs nor rural development needs are included in this
amount.
We might summarize by saying that the growth in tax revenues in
developing countries, on average, kept pace with or bettered the growth
in GDP during the 1970s and 1980s, but it has since been flat. However,
it likely has been slow relative to the demand for public expenditures and
the need to repair and expand infrastructure. Many low income countries
find themselves in almost as difficult a position at the end of the first
decade of the 21st century as they did in the 1970s. This is partly what
has prompted the UN (2005) to call for an increase in taxes equivalent to
4 percent of GDP. However if this historical revenue performance
continues, the millennium development goal of an increase in domestic
revenues equivalent to four percent of GDP would not be reached until
the 2040s.

Copyright © 2014. Edward Elgar Publishing Limited. All rights reserved.
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A lot went on during this forty year period: two oil shocks, a financial
crisis in East Asia, the dramatic growth in the Chinese economy, and
more recently the great recession. All had important fiscal impacts. In
addition, individual countries dealt with natural disasters, debt obligations that could not be repaid, spending that was not adequately controlled, and inflation. Revenue mobilization efforts in developing
countries during this period sometimes were the result of crisis response
to budget deficits. These were quick fix programs and often were either
rate increases or “available” levies such as a bank debit tax, an export
tax, or a new surcharge on imports. Sometimes they were given appealing
names to make them appear to be earmarked for something acceptable,
e.g., the “education tax” in Jamaica. As recently as the early 2000s,
Colombia was forced into an emergency deficit reduction program that
included a temporary surcharge on the individual income tax, a one-time
tax on net wealth, some broadening of the VAT base, and a tax on bank
transactions (Bird, Echavarria, Poterba and Slemrod, 2005). Deficit
reduction was often in step with advice and pressure from the IMF.
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In other cases, the governments initiated a more structured tax reform
effort, aimed at rationalizing the tax system, but the goal of raising more
revenue was usually not too far in the background.7 These revenue
actions were more driven by heavy debt burdens and fiscal deficits in the
1970s and 1980s but since the 1990s there also has been more of a
response to the need to upgrade public services and to remove distortions
in the tax structure. The revenue packages adopted during this period,
and there were many, as well as the failures to act – and there were a lot
of these also – have helped to keep the average rate of taxes somewhere
between 15 and 17 percent of GDP for most low income countries.
A number of different factors were at work to slow revenue growth
over this time period. Some had to do with economics, some with
management problems, and some with the preferences of voters for
smaller governments. Most important of all were the political factors
which showed up as unwillingness to tax. I would identify the following
as the most important of these dampening influences on tax revenue
growth.
First, a steep learning curve. Membership in the UN grew from 39 to
93 between 1950 and 1969. Most of these new countries wanted to
develop their tax systems, but local expertise was limited (Goode, 1993,
pp. 2–3). Few developing countries had a tax system that had a base that
was broad enough to be both revenue productive and fair, and relatively
free of distortions, and a weak tax administration compounded the
problems. This held back revenue growth.
Since that time, countries, bilateral donors and international agencies
have invested a great deal of effort and funding to assist countries with
the task of strengthening their revenue systems. More than 40 years of
this kind of advice, and government efforts to upgrade the capacity of the
tax administration machinery, have led to significant growth in the
knowledge about how to build a better tax system, and about what to do
when revenue growth gets off course. Moreover, the present leadership in
Ministries of Finance is in most cases well trained and able to lead
modern reform efforts. Countries have learned but they have been slow to
apply these lessons, and this partly explains the continued limited growth
in revenue mobilization. Apparently, there remains a gap between the
practice in developing countries and best international practice, and
technical assistance is still needed to close this gap.8
Second, narrow tax bases. The tax net in many developing countries
does not include some of the faster growing segments of the economy,
and this has led to a weak automatic revenue-income elasticity of the tax
system. Significant parts of the fast growing service sector are not
covered by VAT (Bird and Gendron, 2007), the self-employed and small
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businesses escape payment of the individual income tax (Engelschalk,
2004), a significant amount of corporate profits are taken back in
incentives, the progressivity in individual income tax rate structures has
been reduced (Bird and Zolt, 2005), some excises are levied under
specific rates (Cnossen, 2005), and capital gains on real estate are usually
not taxed (Bahl and Martinez-Vazquez, 2008). The lowered automatic
response of tax revenues to GDP growth has forced governments to rely
more on discretionary tax increases which are highly visible to voters and
opposition politicians.
Third, taxpayer resistance. The narrow tax base meant that the burden
of taxes fell disproportionately on large taxpayers and on those in the
formal sector. On this part of the population, the “easy to tax”, the
effective rate was much higher. The predictable result was that businesses
complained that increased taxes were harming their competitive position
and were unconvinced that further increases in taxes would buy better
public services. Wage earners tracked their PAYE deductions but also
knew that the self-employed were getting a free pass on the individual
income tax. Some businesses faced a full tax burden under the corporate
income tax and value added tax, but watched others enjoy incentives and
holidays. The general public did not see much evidence that evaders were
being caught and harshly punished. In this setting, taxpayer morale is
low, which erodes confidence in government and further dampens the
compliance rate and the willingness to accept higher levels of taxation
(Bird, Martinez-Vazquez and Torgler (2006)). This resistance was no
doubt a factor that held down the growth in tax revenues.
Fourth, a changing fiscal world. Increased taxation during this period
was constrained by a changing world economic order that closed down
some of the tax handles that developing countries made use of in earlier
years. Trade liberalization brought a flattening of tariff rates on imports
and customs duties have been declining as a share of GDP. The revenue
loss was recovered by increased domestic taxes in middle income
countries, but this was much less the case in low income countries
(Baunsgaard and Keen, 2010). Customs duties will continue to decline in
importance in the revenue structures of low income countries. The
problem is particularly acute in some low income countries that continue
to rely heavily on taxes on international trade, and in some very small
countries that have little by way of a domestic commerce or manufacturing sector. For example, Lesotho and St. Kitts derive nearly one half of
revenues from customs duties.
Increased capital mobility has dampened interest in taxing corporations
and high income individuals at higher effective rates. This poses an
especially difficult problem for revenue mobilization in developing
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countries that depend heavily on collections from large taxpayers. Big
companies have long been a good target for taxation, and the corporate
income tax is a more important component of the revenue structure in
developing than in industrial countries. But with global capital markets,
there is an increased threat of capital flight and more pressure to reduce
corporate income tax rates and provide stronger incentives. In order to
attract foreign direct investment in more competitive markets, developing
countries have given in to the pressures.
Fifth, globalization and competition. Economic development and more
recently globalization has meant that economies in all countries have
become more complicated. This makes the job of building the right tax
structure reform much harder to do and strains the ability of the tax
administration to collect from some of the new types of economic
activity. The temptation, often not resisted during this period of globalization, was to simply raise the tax rate. This generated a revenue bump
but usually did not increase the automatic revenue-income elasticity.
The consumption of services, electronic commerce, complicated partnership and corporate arrangements, small businesses and foreign investors all have become a more important part of the potential tax net.
Engelschalk (2004) gives an interesting example of the magnitude of the
problem with small business. Nearly two million small businesses were
established in Poland in the 1990s, placing an enormous burden on the
tax administration both because of the magnitude of the task and because
the new small businesses had little time to organize proper books of
account and develop good compliance habits.
Multinational companies pose a particularly difficult challenge because
of their ability to avoid or defer taxes by using intra-group transactions.
While industrial countries have the wherewithal to deal with these
changing features of the tax net, developing countries generally do not
(McLure, 2006). The failure to fully capture the potential tax base was
another factor that held back revenue growth.
Sixth, the hard-to-tax sector. Particularly difficult sectors of the
economy to bring into the tax net are small and medium size firms,
self-employed professionals, farmers, and individual proprietorships.
These so-called “hard-to-tax” may be in both the formal and informal
sectors of the economy (Alm, Martinez-Vazquez and Schneider, 2004).
Exact measurement of the revenue loss attributable to the hard to tax
sector is difficult. Estimates of the size of the “shadow economy” – the
market-based production of goods and services that is not counted in
GDP – have been made (Schneider, 2002). These estimates show the
shadow economy to be considerably larger in developing countries than
in OECD countries, e.g., an average of 41 percent in Africa versus 18
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percent in OECD countries in 1999–2000. Using these estimates of
inter-country variations in the size of the shadow economy as a proxy for
the “hard to tax” sector, Alm, Martinez-Vazquez and Schneider (2004)
have estimated an average revenue cost equivalent to 25 percent of total
potential revenue collections.
Sixth, corruption. Corruption has slowed the growth in revenue collections. The dampening effect on revenues has taken place in several ways.
A bribe paid to a tax official in return for less than full collection of the
amount due reduces the effective rate of taxation. Another impact was
more indirect. The presence of corrupt government officials drove some
activities to the informal sector of the economy and outside the tax net,
and dissuaded investment (Martinez-Vazquez, Arze del Granado and
Boex, 2007). A third issue is that the population who paid the bribes may
have viewed this payment as a substitute for taxation, and the end result
may have been to further stiffen the resistance to increased government
taxes. Finally, corruption also took the form of favor-trading or outright
bribery of political leaders who were in a position to influence tax
legislation to benefit certain parties.
Though there is not conclusive evidence about the revenue costs of
corruption, there is a growing body of research on this question.
Martinez-Vazquez et al. (2007, p. 6) argue that it is a “poor country
disease” and calculate the simple correlation between the transparency
international corruption perception index and per capita GDP at 0.85.
Using the Transparency International index, Bahl (2006) found that the
increase in the tax ratio over the 1970–2000 period was about half as
much in the 15 most corrupt developing countries as in the others. In
cross-section regression analyses, Gupta (2007) and Bird et al. (2006)
found that higher rates of corruption dampened the level of revenue
mobilization.
Finally, politics. Revenue growth was held back and revenue structures
weakened by the politics of taxation. Democratic governance grew
significantly over this period, and relatively short election cycles gave
politicians a high discount rate and therefore an aversion to tax increases.
Moreover, politicians (elected or not) are driven to varying extents by
interest groups who may push hard for more preferential treatments in
the tax regime, and for less draconian enforcement measures. If politicians are swayed by the demands of these interest groups, the net result
is a less buoyant tax system. It would be the rare external tax review
during this period that has not commented on the unwillingness of the
government to undertake necessary structural reforms or administrative
improvements. It would not be too far off the mark to say that good
politics has trumped good taxation during this period.
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Inter-country Variations
The discussion above was based on the average tax revenue performance
in low income countries. But averages sometimes lie. It paints with too
broad a brush to conclude that the tax ratio in all developing countries
increased by only 1.2 percent of GDP between the 1970s and the first
decade of the 2000s. For example, we can note that the tax ratio
increased by a significant amount in Brazil and South Africa during this
period. However, in India the increase was smaller, and in Mexico and
Pakistan there was a decrease.
The IMF (2011) examined a time series of data on the ratio of taxes to
GDP for various groupings of developing countries. They found a general
relationship between income level and tax ratio growth during the period,
with upper middle income countries showing some growth, especially in
the 2000s, but with other developing countries showing little or no
growth between 1980 and 2008. Their analysis of performance by region
suggests long term growth in tax revenue mobilization only in Latin
America.
This variation in tax revenue mobilization has been examined in a
more systematic way with statistical analyses. The dependent variable to
be explained is the ratio of tax revenue to GDP. These analyses are not
strictly comparable because the samples, time periods, specification of
the estimating equations, and estimation methods differ, but most are
cross-section analyses. A representative sample of these studies is Lotz
and Morss, 1967; Bahl, 1971; Tait, Gratz and Eichengreen, 1979; Tanzi,
1992; Bird et al., 2006, and Pessino and Fenochietto, 2010. There is
some consistency in the results of this research, and this may help us
explain why some developing countries increased their tax ratio while
others did not. Higher levels of per capita GDP and more openness in the
economy seem to have driven higher tax ratios; larger shares of GDP in
the mining sector and lower shares in agriculture are associated with
higher tax ratios; and corruption has dampened revenue mobilization.
Inferring a time path for the tax ratio for a country is tricky business. But
these results suggest that the tax ratio will rise with per capita GDP.

THE STRUCTURE OF TAXATION
How a country taxes is as important as how much it taxes. Tax structure
choices can lead to faster versus slower rates of economic growth, more
or less redistribution, and more revenue volatility over the business cycle.
The tax structure also affects fairness, the extent to which certain sectors
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or activities are singled out for preferential treatment. There is by now a
substantial literature that shows that taxes do matter, at least in the
industrial countries. The results are more ambiguous in developing
countries.9
The mix of taxes, as between direct and indirect taxes, or by type of
tax, is one way to describe tax structure. The coverage of the tax base
and the rate regime is another. The latter can give a richer answer to the
questions about how taxes affect economic behavior, fairness and revenue
flows, but it is very difficult to work with inter-country variations in tax
rate and base details in an econometric analysis.

Copyright © 2014. Edward Elgar Publishing Limited. All rights reserved.
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At least in theory, there is an answer to the normative question about the
best tax mix. Atkinson and Stiglitz’ (1976) path breaking work led us to
a statement of the conditions under which a tax on wages is a Paretoefficient tax structure. Various researchers have expanded on this work to
show how real world conditions (e.g., the cost of administration, the
presence of tax evasion, horizontal equity considerations) could lead to
an optimal tax structure that would include indirect taxes. While this
work has been useful in setting a research framework, its implications
have not been so easily absorbed by those responsible for the formulation
of tax policy in developing countries.
The tax structure choices made by political leaders are pragmatic
decisions driven by current circumstances in a country, by external
events, and by politics. Overtime, the tax mix might change in response
to a deficit in the budget, as when a country adopts a revenue enhancement measure. Or, it might be changed in bigger ways when it comes out
of a comprehensive reform program. Lessons from the theory about how
taxes affect the economy are less likely to lead tax reform in the case of
annual budget adjustments than in the case of comprehensive reform.
What is commonly referred to as “best practice” sometimes is copied,
and it is here that theory may have an important indirect effect. The
widespread adoption of the value added tax and its more or less careful
implementation is a case in point.10
Long run changes in tax mix may be linked to economic development
in a more or less systematic way. The “tax handles” explanation,
originally developed by Hinrichs (1966) and more fully developed by
Musgrave (1969), explain tax structure choices and until recently seemed
to square with evidence on choices that have been made. The argument
goes that at lower levels of development, countries will tax those bases
that can be reached with least administrative effort, such as agricultural
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land, imports and exports, and the largest companies. As the domestic
economy begins to modernize, indirect taxes are imposed, initially as
turnover taxes that are limited to importers, manufacturers and large
distributors, and excises.11 At the next stage they impose a more modern
sales tax (VAT) alongside excises, and begin to move away from customs
duties. Company income taxes play a role in revenue mobilization before
individual income taxes and social security payroll taxes, which come
later, with upper middle income and industrial status.
Actual changes in the tax mix over the past 40 years have pretty much
followed this progression.12 The growth in tax revenues as a percent of
GDP in the industrial countries since the 1970s has been driven by VAT
and social security contributions.13 While the traditional personal and
corporate income taxes seemed to have maxed out as a share of total
taxes after the 1970s, the combination of income taxes and social security
taxes now accounts for about 60 percent of tax revenues (Tanzi, 2011;
Martinez-Vazquez, et al., 2011; and Bahl, 2006).
The reliance on direct taxes by industrial countries fits the “tax
handles” explanation for tax structure choices in the development process. However, the rapid growth of VAT revenues and the flat growth rate
of income taxes suggest a growing preference for consumption taxes,
perhaps in response to the greater importance placed on economic
growth, and the fear of capital flight. A good test of the tax handles
theory of tax structure development in industrial countries must wait until
economic growth resumes at normal rates and the objectives of tax policy
change are more broadly focused.
Developing countries have steadily moved their mix towards domestic
indirect taxes. The reliance on taxes on international trade has fallen and
the share of income taxes has remained about the same since the 1970s.
By the 2000s, developing countries raised about 40 percent of their tax
revenues from domestic indirect taxes and about one-quarter from
income taxes. While per capita GDP has increased in low income
countries in the past four decades, and the graduation to more modern
general sales taxes is evident, the move toward a heavier reliance on
direct taxes has not happened. Reliance on the corporate income tax has
increased in recent years but this is not likely to be sustainable, and there
has been little if any growth in the individual income tax. The IMF
(2011, p. 31) characterizes the individual income tax in developing
countries as “stagnant”.
If the tax handles explanation is correct, the ratio of direct to indirect
taxes should rise with per capita GDP. Martinez-Vazquez et al. (2011)
cannot find a significant relationship in their econometric analysis of 161
countries. They do find, however, that the direct tax share is higher where
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the overall level of taxation is higher, suggesting a covariation with the
stage of development. Their result (page 54) is a powerful one: a 10
percentage point higher tax to GDP ratio is associated with a 2.1 to 3.7
percentage point higher direct to indirect tax ratio.
Where we find things in the second decade of the 2000s is that
countries lie all along the tax handles continuum. Some of the lowest
income countries, particularly in Africa, continue to rely heavily on
customs duties and excise taxes (e.g., Mozambique and Congo DR),
many developing countries raise more than half of tax revenues from
domestic indirect levies (e.g., Costa Rica), some middle income countries
are graduating to a heavier use of direct taxes (e.g., Brazil), and the tax
structures of most OECD countries are dominated by direct taxes. There
does not appear to be a great deal of convergence in the way that high
and low income countries tax, but there does seem to be a strong trend
toward de-emphasis of income taxation and toward emphasis of consumption taxes.
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The major change in the tax mix in developing countries over the past
four decades has been the continuing shift toward domestic indirect taxes
(general sales taxes including VAT). The share in total taxes continued to
increase in the 1990s and 2000s and now accounts for more than 40
percent, twice the share in industrial countries. Several factors explain
this shift. Trade liberalization has led to a reduction in revenues from
customs duties, with the replacement largely by domestic sales taxes.
This has increased the premium on “getting it right” with the structure of
domestic sales taxes.
Another explanation is that governments in low income countries see
sales taxes and excises as a better way to protect revenue than income
taxes. Some of the income that escapes the individual income tax net via
self-employment or small business activity will be captured by a broadbased consumption tax. Moreover, while no tax is an easy political sell,
consumption tax increases that do not include necessities might be more
palatable than an increase in the PAYE or the corporate income tax rate.
The shift to indirect taxes is partly due to what some would see as the
irresistible advantages of the VAT. In 1980, only about 15 non-industrial
countries levied a VAT, but by 2000 this number had risen to about 80
(IMF, 2011). Few would argue that the VAT has not improved the tax
structures in low and middle income countries.14 It led to eliminating the
cascading effects of turnover taxes, the tax treatment of exports was
significantly improved and it is perceived to be friendlier to economic

/

Job: Bird2-Taxation_and_Development

/

Division: 12-chapter12CEReady

/Pg. Position: 14 /

Date: 18/8

JOBNAME: Bird PAGE: 17 SESS: 8 OUTPUT: Mon Aug 18 09:34:10 2014

Copyright © 2014. Edward Elgar Publishing Limited. All rights reserved.

A retrospective on taxation in developing countries

419

growth than an equal yield income tax. It is also the case that the VAT
was strongly urged by international agencies, and its successful
implementation was greatly assisted by the IMF (Keen and Lockwood,
2010).
The shift toward indirect taxation could also be a result of the general
sales tax having a greater elasticity than the rest of the tax system.
However, the jury is still out on whether the adoption of VAT has led to
higher rates of revenue mobilization in low income countries (Bird and
Gendron, 2007, pp. 194–196). In some middle income and developing
countries the revenue bonanza was realized, but in others the revenue
performance of the VAT did not meet the high expectations. Most of the
revenue disappointments were of countries’ own making, i.e., narrow tax
bases, “exemption creep”, and weak enforcement.
The other major component of the indirect tax system is selective sales
taxes or excises. The distinguishing feature of these levies is selectivity in
coverage and discrimination in intent (Cnossen, 2005). In their basic
form they focus on a few products, use physical controls and in some
cases use specific rates. In low income countries, excises are levied
against large tax bases (petroleum products, liquor, beer and tobacco
products) which are relatively price inelastic in demand, and which
impose some social costs. The two principal objectives of excises are
(a) revenue, and (b) deriving compensation from consumption that
generates social costs. The revenue function has always been more
important in developing countries. The importance of the externality
objective in poor countries is that it can provide good political cover for
increases in excise tax rates.
Excises are the classic example of a tax handle. Because of their ease
in administration, they were used especially heavily in countries at the
lowest level of development. They continue to account for a significant
share of tax revenue mobilization: 16 percent in Latin America, 15
percent in Asia, and 11 percent in Africa (Bird and Zolt, 2005). Even as
countries moved to higher levels of development, they often held on to
excises to protect revenues, e.g., the current 25 percent of total tax
revenues in Singapore. In ASEAN countries, excises contribute more to
total revenues than do import duties (Cnossen, 2011). However, excises
are declining in importance as a tax source in developing and developed
countries, because of the specific rates that are used in some countries,
and because of the gradual migration of the excise tax base to general
sales taxes.
Has the more intensive use of indirect taxes led to stronger economic
growth and to distribution outcomes that match up with government
objectives? The evidence on this point is not all that clear. Several

Columns Design XML Ltd

/

Job: Bird2-Taxation_and_Development

/

Division: 12-chapter12CEReady

/Pg. Position: 15 /

Date: 18/8

JOBNAME: Bird PAGE: 18 SESS: 8 OUTPUT: Mon Aug 18 09:34:10 2014

420

Taxation and development

Copyright © 2014. Edward Elgar Publishing Limited. All rights reserved.

empirical studies report that replacing an income tax with an equal yield
consumption tax would lead to a higher rate of economic growth, but the
results are robust only for industrial countries (Martinez-Vazquez et al.,
2011). Much the same result holds for the impact of the direct/indirect
tax ratio on macroeconomic stability, redistribution and foreign direct
investment. One explanation for this result is that there is no impact, that
a general consumption tax dampens economic growth about as much as
an equal yield income tax. A more plausible explanation is that a tax mix
indicator, such as the direct/indirect tax ratio, hides the great intercountry variation in the rate and base structure and obscures the
statistical result for developing countries.
Potentially, the VAT probably does lead to better economic growth
outcomes than the income tax. But the full promise of the VAT has not
been realized because countries have not been willing to structure it in
the broad-based form that advocates have argued, i.e., a tax with
exemptions limited to necessities and zero rating limited to exports, and
the nominal rate set at “a reasonable level”. In fact, many low income
countries have chosen multiple rates, narrowed the base with numerous
exemptions and zero ratings, and allowed rates to rise to levels that have
encouraged avoidance. Perhaps even more important is the efficiency
with which the VAT is enforced, which varies widely from country to
country. The IMF (2011, p. 25) estimates that the C-efficiency of the VAT
(the ratio of VAT revenue to the product of the standard VAT rate and
consumption) is about 56 percent in high income countries but only 38 to
47 percent in low income and lower middle income countries.
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Taxes on International Trade
In the early stages of development, imports can be more easily taxed than
income or domestic consumption, because the tax base is so easily
identified. Customs duties can be collected without lag with a simple rate
increase, and because they can be highly targeted and easily used to
protect domestic industry. Eventually, customs duties give way to taxes
on domestic consumption as interest in protection wanes, as the formal
sector of the economy grows and income taxes take on more of a revenue
role, and, as we have recently seen, as the international community take
an interest in reducing restrictions to trade. But passing through these
stages has been a long process for some countries.
Chelliah (1971) reports that the share of import duties fell for the 35
developing countries he studied for the 1953–55 to 1966–68 period. The
rate of decline seems to have accelerated in the past two decades,
arguably due to the effects of trade liberalization in general and to

/

Job: Bird2-Taxation_and_Development

/

Division: 12-chapter12CEReady

/Pg. Position: 16 /

Date: 18/8

JOBNAME: Bird PAGE: 19 SESS: 8 OUTPUT: Mon Aug 18 09:34:10 2014

A retrospective on taxation in developing countries

421

adherence to WTO rules and to new inter-country trade agreements. The
impact of this decline on total revenue mobilization is less clear and
seems to vary by the development level of the country. For most
industrial countries trade revenues were not very important during this 40
year period. For low income countries that have long depended on
customs duties, the declines have been much greater. Ideally, the revenue
loss due to tariff reduction would be replaced by a broadening of the
sales tax base and an increase in excises. In practice, the revenue losses
in middle income countries have been recaptured, but with a variety of
tax instruments. In most low income countries, there has been less
success (Baunsgaard and Keen, 2010).
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Taxes on Income
Income taxes have long been an appealing source of revenue in the
industrial countries. The attraction to the ability to pay argument for
distributing tax burdens, and the possibility of introducing a progressive
rate structure for the individual income tax, seemed to be in step with
notions about equity, at least up to the 1980s. The corporate income tax
has held on, continuing to account for about 10 percent of tax revenues
since the 1970s, despite many good arguments to scrap it. Together the
individual and corporate income taxes, and social security contributions
account for about the same percent of total tax revenue in the 2000s as in
the 1970s (Tanzi, 2011).
The story in low income countries is a little different. The appeal of the
corporate tax is that large corporations are relatively few in number,
easily identified and especially foreign firms generally comply with the
law. The corporation income tax accounts for a greater share of tax
revenue in developing countries than in industrial countries.
Because the revenue yield is so important in low income countries,
some of the problems have been ignored or assumed away. It has been
popular to assume this to be a tax on capital that is either paid by higher
income residents or exported to foreigners. The alternate view, that in
small open economies it will be borne by labor, is sometimes dismissed
(Echavarria and Zodrow, 2005). Another problem is the pressure from
powerful interest groups to lower the tax, which often leads to a
complicated incentive regime. This leads to a national industrial policy
where politicians, rather than markets, pick the winners.
There are several reasons to question the sustainability of the corporation tax as a continuing productive revenue source in developing
countries. If the practice and the results in the industrial countries is a
guide, the corporate tax may lead to a slower rate of economic growth.
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International capital mobility raises concerns about taxing away the
mobile base, and transfer pricing possibilities for large multinationals
pose tax administration challenges that many low income countries
cannot meet. The response to the capital mobility concern has been a
reduction in income tax rates, though not as steep as in industrial
countries, and a continued proliferation of incentives.
The individual income tax is of a lesser order of importance in
developing countries, accounting for about half as much revenue as the
corporate income tax. The appeal of an individual income tax in low
income countries is that it provides an easy target for the tax net – PAYE
wage earners. It also offers the possibility for adding some progressivity
to the tax system, though this is often overblown as an advantage because
of the exemptions and deductions allowed, because of a low compliance
rate by high income earners who are outside the formal sector, and
because of the low effective rate at which individual income taxes are
levied (Bird and Zolt, 2005).
Individual income taxes pose numerous problems for developing
countries. Most developing countries levy the individual income tax as a
payroll tax on withholdings on large formal sector firms. The coverage is
usually quite narrow. A large proportion of the self-employed and small
businesses are either outside the tax net or they underreport. This leaves
a considerable horizontal inequity with PAYE sector workers, erodes
confidence in the system, and drives some activity to the informal sector.
The effects on the economy are an issue. For one, a PAYE system taxes
labor in a labor-surplus economy. More important is the question of
whether the findings from studies in industrial countries – that high
marginal tax rates dampen investment – carry over to developing nations.

WHAT HAPPENS NEXT?
The gains in revenue mobilization over the past 40 years have been
modest in low income countries, and have fallen far short of what many
estimate to be needed levels. There have been some favorable changes in
the mix of taxes used, in particular the widespread introduction of VAT
and a declining reliance on import duties and specific rate excises, but the
tax bases remain far too narrow in many countries, statutory rates tend to
be high, and compliance rates are too low. The tax administration
efficiency in most low income countries still has much room for
improvement. Though this general description does not fit all developing
countries, it probably is a reasonable description for most.
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In light of this history, we might speculate about what is likely to come
next for taxation in low income countries. The question raised here is
whether there are reasons why developing country governments might
renew their interest in tax revenue mobilization, and in modernizing tax
structures and enforcement regimes. One answer to this question is that
there are such forces in play. The most important are pressing public
expenditure needs, especially the need to deal with a badly deficient
infrastructure. This could call out increases in tax revenue mobilization
that will be greater than the historical rate. There also are structural
responses to external factors (trade liberalization and international capital
mobility) that need to be made, some longstanding problems with
preferential tax treatments that might supplant statutory rate increases to
generate more revenues, and tax administration improvements that have
been put off for too long. But before significant improvements can take
place, the political stance toward tax increases and tax structure changes
must soften.
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Muddling Through
A pessimistic view about the future is that it will not be much different
from the past in terms of revenue mobilization and tax structure change.
Reform will continue to be tough going in developing countries. The
anti-tax group wraps itself in the flag of higher taxes discouraging
economic growth, and the existing tax structure is often protected by
those who are dug in around their entitlements under the present system.
Technocrats in developing countries, who understand the situation very
well, are usually a step or two removed from the decision-making
process. External advisors, who are not encumbered by real world
political economy considerations, are usually among the few who will
stick their necks out for technically good tax reform.
Political inertia is difficult to overcome, especially when the subject is
taxation. One course for the coming decade is more of what the history
reviewed here has shown. The rate of revenue mobilization will creep up
on average, but political forces will hold it to about the same rate of
growth as GDP. If total output in the poor countries grows enough, this
may produce revenue sufficient to allow marginal upgrades in public
services, but not enough to make the progress with infrastructure needs
that the 4 percent of GDP target that the millennium development goals
have identified.
This is not to attribute every slow rate of revenue mobilization entirely
to forces of darkness. There may be a perfectly rational explanation. If
finance really does follow function in developing countries, then the low
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rate of revenue mobilization may be a reflection of a weak demand for
government services and a weak ability of the government to deliver
quality public services. Politicians and voters in some countries may feel
that the size of government is about right, and that additional spending
(beyond the growth rate of GDP) will not produce benefits that will
outweigh the costs of the necessary taxation. This might explain, for
example, the case of Mexico where the ratio of tax to GDP has been held
at a low rate even by comparison with countries at the same income level.
Lindblom’s “muddling through” (1959) implies gradualism but not the
absence of change. The tax rate and base structure will change under a
gradualism approach, but the changes will be mostly marginal. Preferential treatments will be added and subtracted, but big bang efforts at base
broadening will not be brought to the table. Periodically, when some of
the excesses are deemed to be too great, a commission will be appointed
to examine the tax structure and some changes will be made, but these
will not typically involve the big entitlements on the tax or the expenditure side of the budget.
Even if gradualism is the strategy adopted by most countries, there will
be outliers, i.e., countries that do undertake major reforms that involve
significant increases in the rate of revenue mobilization and significant
base changes. These countries will close the gap with industrial countries, at least in terms of the share of GDP allocated to the government
sector. For the period under study here, Brazil, China, and South Africa
are among the countries that have significantly closed the revenue gap.
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There is an alternative to the gradualism scenario. Developing countries
might be pushed into an increased rate of revenue mobilization by the
weight of the expenditure needs that they will face. Current levels of
public services are deficient in most developing countries, and there are
wide disparities among regions inside these countries. The infrastructure
gap is large and likely to grow further. Most developing countries have
come to realize that an internationally competitive economic structure
requires a higher quality infrastructure than is presently in place. In
addition, there is the pressing problem of the woeful level of services and
infrastructure that is available to slum dwellers. Almost all who have
studied this problem argue that a significant part of this gap between
needed and existing public services must be filled by increased tax
revenue mobilization.
Estimates of the needed amounts are staggering, as the following
discussions suggest:
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+ The United Nations (2005) estimates that taxes in developing
countries should rise by 4 percent of GDP to meet the Millennium
Development Goals. This would move the average tax ratio in
developing countries up to about 21 percent of GDP. It is worth
emphasizing that the average tax ratio in developing countries
increased by only 1.2 percent of GDP in the last 40 years.
+ In developing countries, about 1 billion people lack clean water and
perhaps 3 billion lack access to adequate sanitation facilities. The
annual infrastructure expenditure required to meet simply this one
essentially local need has been estimated at 2.0 percent of GDP in
Sub-Saharan Africa and 1.7 percent in South Asia, with about 40
percent of these amounts required for new investment and the
balance for operation and maintenance (Estache 2010).
+ Ingram, Liu and Brandt (2013) estimate that annual urban infrastructure costs will be equivalent to about 3 percent of GDP for
new infrastructure and 2 percent for maintenance. On average,
subnational governments in developing countries raise only about
2.5 percent of GDP in taxes.
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Structural Reform
Revenue structures in most low income countries are saddled with a
narrow tax base. In some cases the tax structure was badly designed
when the system was implemented, in some cases it was not expanded to
capture new activities that grew as part of the modern economy, in other
cases the base was narrowed by deductions and exemptions as various
pressure groups got their way, and in yet other cases some bad taxing
choices were made. The base has been made even more narrow by poor
tax administration practices. On this subject, Casanegra de Jantscher
(1990, p. 179) spoke volumes in a phrase, “tax administration is tax
policy”.
In fact, the timing may be quite right for significant base broadening in
developing countries in the next decade. The VAT has become the
mainstay of the indirect tax system in most countries, and this gives the
right foundation on which to build. Both excise taxes and customs duties
are declining in importance. A start has been made on putting a viable
administrative structure in place in most countries, and has advanced
quite far in some. Perhaps more important, many of the undesirable
options for revenue enhancement have been more or less closed off. VAT
rates are high in many countries, international mobility of capital will
head off increased income tax rates, and higher import duties are
crowded out by trade liberalization.
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This leaves base broadening under the general sales tax as arguably the
most open alternative for structural tax reform. Of the perennials for
revenue enhancement, only excise tax rates would appear to be still in
play. Rolling back incentives under the corporation income tax is called
for, but the revenue gains from this would almost certainly be offset by
statutory rate reductions. The other options for base broadening all have
to do with strengthening the tax administration.
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An improved tax administration can lead to a significant broadening of
the tax base and an increase in the effective tax rate for the system as a
whole. In most countries, the focus needs to be on all components of the
administration: increasing the registration of taxpayers, narrowing the
gap between reported and true tax liability, and increasing the collection
rate. The (hypothetical) results of gaining full compliance with the tax
laws will vary from country to country, but easily would exceed the
millennium development goal target of 4 percent of GDP.
The first step to improving administration is to design a tax system that
can be administered at reasonable cost. This means that the laws should
be clear, and it also means that the system should be as free of
complications as possible. This is a lot easier said than done. Economies
are modernizing with globalization and this requires more complexity in
the tax code. But countries often make the situation worse with a plethora
of exemptions, deductions and special treatments that forces the tax
authority into allocating time to verify deductions that could be better
spent on activities that are closer to the collection phase of administration.
The formula for strengthening tax administration is complicated, and
has many variables, but by now it is well known. The IMF (2011,
pp. 19–23) provides a summary of the needed core reforms: creating a
specialized and highly professional institution to lead tax administration;
segmentation of the taxpaying population, especially large taxpayers, so
as to get a better allocation of audit effort; improved business processes;
and adopting practices that can facilitate improved compliance. Underneath all of this is (a) the need to invest in higher quality staff and
support services to get the job done, and (b) the need for a strengthened
resolve to enforce the tax code.
It would be incorrect to say that no progress has been made, because
there are many examples of significantly improved tax administration
practices in some developing countries. But it would be equally wrong to
say that most developing countries do not have the technical know-how
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to get the job done. The IMF and other technical assistance providers
have been helping with tax administration for nearly a half century. And,
the favorable benefit–cost ratios from investing in tax administration
improvements are well known. The major constraint has long been, and
still is an unwillingness of governments to enforce their tax system. Bird
(2011, p. 41) puts it well: “If the political will is there, the techniques
needed for effective tax administration are not a secret”.
One might even empathize with government officials and political
leaders who face many political constraints, varying from the problems
of bending civil service rules to support an efficient tax administration
cadre, to the inability to resolve inter-agency disputes in the allocation of
tax administration responsibilities, to the unhappy prospect of forcing tax
payments from voters and special friends. Matters are complicated
further in some countries because of a culture of non-payment where tax
evasion is not a matter for great shame, and where corruption is
sometimes accepted as being an inevitable part of things. Still, until
government acts on a resolve to demand full compliance, the need for
improved administration will continue to be high on the list of needed
reforms in developing countries.
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Taxing the Hard to Tax (HTT)
The informal sector, which accounts for perhaps as much as one half of
the population in some countries, might be thought of as a below-poverty
group with limited if any taxpaying capacity, and a non-poor group. The
poor are for the most part outside the property tax and individual income
tax base, have no capital income, consume only limited amounts of
imported goods, and concentrate their consumption spending on goods
that are generally outside the VAT (housing, necessities and unprocessed
foodstuffs). But the non-poor in the informal sector also escape the
individual income tax (and payroll taxes). It is the non-poor in the
informal sector that can become important objects of taxation. As Alm et
al. (2004) show, if this sector could be fully taxed, it would constitute an
important component of the tax base.
Should the effort be made to broaden the base by taxing the HTT
sector? There are a lot of good arguments to leave it alone. For one, we
do not even know who they are, though we believe they include small
businesses, self-employed professionals, and the agriculture sector. The
HTT might also be thought of in terms of their characteristics: great in
number, many have small incomes, many do not reveal adequate books of
account to the tax authority, and most transactions take place in cash
(Thuronyi, 2004). These characteristics suggest that the HTT will be
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costly to tax. In describing the difficulty for the tax authority to get a fix
on their activity, Bird and Wallace (2004) call them ‘ghosts’ (the tax
authority does not know who they are) and ‘icebergs’ (the tax authority
can only see the tip of their activities).
On the other hand, there are important reasons to bring the HTT into
the tax net (Bahl, 2004). Fairness tops the list. This is perhaps clearest in
the case of the individual income tax. PAYE sector workers generally fall
within the tax net because they are easily withheld at source but informal
sector workers usually escape income taxes because they are hard to
catch. This creates a major unfairness, sends a message to society that
noncompliance is acceptable behavior, erodes confidence in the tax
system, and forces up effective rates on those who do pay income taxes.
A tax administration that could catch the self-employed would appreciably improve the horizontal equity of the system and reduce excess
burdens.
The possible revenue impacts are an especially interesting question. In
practice, the taxation of this sector might be a revenue loser. The use of
presumptive methods has generally led to a lower tax liability than the
income tax or VAT systems (Engelschalk, 2004). For example, if a
presumptive tax regime were adopted, setting the threshold too high
could induce firms to migrate to this system and would provide an
incentive to avoid graduation to the normal tax system. On the other
hand, a presumptive regime might stimulate employment generation by
the small business sector, and therefore boost revenues from consumption
taxes. Either way, the small business sector would now be part of the
formal economy and a member of the taxpaying community.
The case for going after self-employed professionals is clearer cut.
They are usually registered to practice (doctors, lawyers and the like),
and have significant taxable income. The revenue yield could be significant. Professional self-employed individuals should be relatively easy to
identify, but as in the case of small businesses, will be costly to assess
and audit.
Fiscal Decentralization
The assignment of more taxing powers to subnational governments could
result, at least in some countries, in measureable increases in revenue
mobilization. Provincial and local governments in developing countries
raise 2.4 percent of GDP in taxes, which is about one-third the rate in
industrial countries.
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The involvement of subnational governments in the fiscal system in
developing and transition countries varies widely from country to country. Comparative analyses show that the share of government expenditures made by provincial and local governments tends to be higher in
large countries, in those with a higher level of per capita GDP, and in
those with a more heterogeneous population (Bahl and Wallace, 2005;
Boadway and Shah, 2009). But in only a few countries does taxation by
subnational governments figure prominently in national revenue mobilization.
The low level of revenues raised by subnational governments in
developing countries is cited often as a failing of the intergovernmental
fiscal system (Bahl and Bird, 2008; Martinez-Vazquez, 2013). In most
developing countries, subnational governments have only limited taxing
power, but it is also the case that they often underuse the taxing power
that they do have. Central (state) governments are loathe to give up their
control over the tax base for fear that their own revenue mobilization
efforts will be harmed by the competition, and elected local government
leaders are not always anxious to have the accountability that comes with
increased taxing powers. There also is a more pure political dimension.
Increased local taxing power may enhance the success and hence
visibility of local politicians, who may be present or future political
rivals.
There are good prospects for significantly more revenue mobilization
by subnational governments (Bahl, Linn and Wetzel, 2013). Three
reasons might be cited. First, revenue targets such as 4 percent of GDP as
laid out in connection with the millennium development goals are very
large and passing some of this responsibility to lower level governments
might be a more viable political strategy now than has been the case in
the past. Second, much of the new expenditure pressure is coming from
infrastructure and slum development needs in urban areas, and more
financing from local sources could give a better match with benefits
received.
Third, experience with subnational government revenue mobilization in
recent years suggests good prospects for success. Though several types of
non-property taxes can meet the revenue test and can satisfy efficiency
norms to a reasonable extent, these options are not widely used in
developing countries. Where they are used, they are often badly designed.
This said, it should be noted that some metropolitan area local governments in developing countries have adopted broad-based taxes (MartinezVazquez, 2013). Where metropolitan local governments have provincial
status, the assignment of sales and payroll taxes has been more easily
done. The local business tax accounts for one-third of city and provincial
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revenues in China, and the gross receipts tax accounts for 70 percent of
revenues in the capital district of Buenos Aires. Various forms of local
sales tax have also done well in Bogota and São Paulo where they
account for about one-third of revenues.
A missing element in most tax structures in developing countries is the
property tax. The average rate against GDP in developing countries is
about 0.6 percent, by comparison with 2.2 percent in OECD countries
(Bahl and Martinez-Vazquez, 2008). There is ample space for a property
tax revenue increase in most countries, from a combination of structural
and administrative reforms. The major structural reforms needed are to
eliminate the widespread preferential treatments that are given to various
sectors, and to implement regular revaluations to give the property tax
base some elasticity. On the administrative side, there is much to be
done, including increasing the rate of property registrations, reducing the
gap between assessed values and market values by improving valuation
methods, and improving collection efficiency. It is not uncommon to find
an average ratio of assessed to full market value of less than 50 percent,
and collection rates that are even lower (Bahl, 2009; McCluskey and
Franzsen, 2013).
Property tax reform might be extended to the property transfer tax, the
tax levied on the value of exchanges of real property. In principle, the
property transfer tax is an attempt to capture a portion of the gain in
property value realized by the seller, i.e., a capital gains tax on real
estate. In fact, in most countries, it is a badly structured revenue measure.
Usually, it is a gross sales tax on declared value of the transfer, which
leads to a great understatement of the actual value of the property.
Converting the transfer tax to a capital gains levy may seem a step too far
for most developing country tax administrations, but one might consider
that the present transfer tax is mostly levied on a notional basis (Bahl and
Wallace, 2010). The merger of the administrations of the property
transfer tax and the annual property tax would seem a natural step and
could lead to significant improvements in the revenue mobilization from
both taxes.
Finally, there is the case of the rural land tax. In most developing
countries, the agricultural sector goes largely untaxed, even though an
agricultural income tax may be in the tax code, as in Pakistan. A land tax,
based on potential yield, has been discussed as a solution (Ahmad and
Stern, 1989; Rajaraman, 2004). The difficult job of assessment might be
manageable if the rural land tax were assigned to local governments, who
have the advantage of familiarity.
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Tax Reform or Fiscal Reform?
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Differential incidence is the analytic framework used for most evaluations of tax structure change. Concern about effects on the economy has
usually centered on tax impacts rather than expenditure impacts, equity
dealt with the regressivity of the tax system rather than also include
consideration of the distributional impacts of the expenditures made with
this money, and the administrative dimension was focused on efficiency
in assessing and collecting taxes independent of the efficiency of
government spending.
The next decade might be the right time to ask the broader question
about net fiscal benefits, i.e., an analysis that also takes account of the
expenditure side of the budget. This would be a more difficult job, would
require more resources and time, and will raise many more controversial
issues, but it will allow the government to get a better picture of the
overall implications of the financing reform under consideration. After
all, it is increased expenditures that one is trying to sell, not increased
taxes.
What would be the advantages of a balanced budget approach to
studying tax incidence? Certainly it would open the door for a farranging analysis and for considering many more reform options. A few
examples of the broader questions that might be asked are:
+ The vertical equity question could be broadened to consider both
tax burdens and expenditure benefits. The differential tax incidence
approach to comprehensive reform often leaves the issue with a
statement such as “the distributional effects are better dealt with on
the expenditure side of the budget.” The comprehensive fiscal
reform would build this directly into the analysis.
+ The revenue target of the financing reform could be identified in
terms of the projected elasticity of desired expenditures. This would
be a far better method of defining revenue needs than the “revenue
neutrality,” used in differential incidence analysis.
+ A balanced budget incidence analysis would allow exploring the
impacts of funding an expenditure program with a combination of
taxes and user charges.
If the expenditure side of the budget were taken more directly into account,
the case for greater rates of revenue mobilization probably would be more
easily made. This would involve factoring in the positive economic development effects of increased spending for pro-development infrastructure and

Columns Design XML Ltd

/

Job: Bird2-Taxation_and_Development

/

Division: 12-chapter12CEReady

/Pg. Position: 27 /

Date: 18/8

JOBNAME: Bird PAGE: 30 SESS: 8 OUTPUT: Mon Aug 18 09:34:10 2014

432

Taxation and development

services; the progressive effects of expenditure benefits, and even the political favor that comes with increased public expenditures.
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If developing countries buy into the need to increase their rate of revenue
mobilization and to make structural reforms, it will provide a good
setting for revisiting the question of vertical equity in taxation. This is
much needed. There is not much question about redistribution being an
important role for government. Nor is there much debate about the need
for fiscal redistribution in developing countries where the gap in living
standards between the rich and the poor is so great. Nor has there been
much debate about what policymakers would like to measure in evaluating a tax proposal – the change in effective tax rates across family
income levels.
Unfortunately, those who must make the tax structure decision have
not usually gotten the information they wanted to make the decision.
Unfortunately, the equity discussion is sometimes confused, and often is
not fact-based. Too often, a specific proposal for reform is simply
declared to be regressive, based on impressionistic reasoning. To the
extent there is a science in tax policy design, the analysis of vertical
equity is arguably the weakest part.
The empirical work that is usually done in tax burden studies is heavily
driven by assumptions about the final incidence of each tax. Once the
question of who bears the burden is assumed, the distribution of this
burden across income classes is estimated, usually by consumer expenditure surveys that are often limited in terms of the number of consumption categories reported, by data of asset wealth by income class (if such
data exist), and by data taken from the tax files. The effects of evasion on
vertical equity are usually not factored in, nor are the impacts of the
proposed tax change on the pre-tax distribution of income. As a result of
all of this, it may be the case that empirical burden studies, well-meaning
though they might be, are so flawed that they are not helpful at all.
For these reasons, it can be argued to make vertical equity a secondary
issue in tax reform, i.e., that vertical equity cannot be the driving force
behind a comprehensive tax reform program in a developing country
(Bahl, 1991). In part, this is because most developing countries cannot
implement progressive tax systems, and in part it is because the costs of
moving to a higher level of vertical equity are very high. These costs
might include the revenue loss due to exemption of low income families
from tax, the efficiency costs associated with the higher rates imposed
elsewhere to make up for the revenue loss, and possibly the displacement
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effects that might result from the introduction of “progressive” measures
such as high marginal personal income tax rates. Finally, note that the tax
instrument with the most potential for targeting on the wealthy, the
individual income tax, does not weigh heavily in the tax structure of most
developing countries (Bird and Zolt, 2005).
A better approach to the vertical equity issue is to concentrate on the
impact on the bottom deciles of the income distribution, as was done in
the Indonesia tax reform (Gillis, 1989). This might be a more manageable task because these groups are sometimes below the threshold for
certain taxes, and because the major components of their consumption
basket usually are reported in consumer surveys. If they are not, special
surveys of the consumption habits of the poorest may be feasible (Bird
and Miller, 1989).
Finally, the next generation of burden studies would do well to
consider tax changes in a broader context, including the effects of the tax
change on the pre-tax distribution of income, and on the expenditure
benefits purchased by the increase in tax revenues. What really matters is
the fiscal incidence on poor families. But this will call for an entirely new
approach to studying fiscal equity, because so little is known about the
impact of either taxes or expenditures on poverty reduction (Bird, 1992,
Chapter 5). And, it might lead to a stronger case for increased revenue
mobilization, than does the present approach that considers only the cost
side of tax reform.

Copyright © 2014. Edward Elgar Publishing Limited. All rights reserved.

Willingness to Tax
The major constraint to the successful reform of tax regimes in low
income countries is the absence of a willingness of the government to
make tax choices that are politically unpopular, and to enforce its tax
regime. The underlying problem is a combination of not being able to
resist the temptation to choose reforms that take the path of least political
resistance rather than reforms that would lead to a more efficient tax
structure, the failure to muster the political courage to tax powerful (and
tax-favored) groups in the economy, the propensity to try and curry favor
with voters with well-intentioned but misguided tax structure decisions,
and an unwillingness to enforce the tax regime that is in place. In some
developing countries, the result has been a minimal growth in tax revenue
mobilization and a level of public services that has continued to fall
behind. The result has been the small increase in the average tax rate in
developing countries, and the failure to significantly broaden the tax
base.
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Arguably the action that has held back increased revenue mobilization
and structural reform, more than any other, is the special tax preferences
that have been given to favored groups and the refusal to remove these
entitlements once they are given. Economic development incentives have
been given to targeted industries, arguably as part of a national industrial
policy. But it is well known that these incentives are sometimes given on
a basis of political considerations, without careful cost benefit analysis of
the proposals. More often than not, incentives carry no sunset provision,
under which review of the impacts would be required as a condition for
continuation.
Exemptions from sales and individual income taxes are often justified
on equity grounds, but just as often these incentives benefit the non-poor
as well as the poor. Governments sometimes believe that they can
identify social goods that ought to receive preferential tax treatment.16
However, rarely is there a hard analysis of whether this targeting achieves
its purposes. In some cases, sectors or consumption items or even firms
have been targeted for special treatment for such a long time that the
preferences become institutionalized. This strengthens the case for a
regular re-evaluation of exemptions.
The other part of the willingness problem is the failure of governments
to strictly enforce the tax regime that is in place. The problem is often
cast as the administrative capacity not being adequate to do a strict
enforcement of the tax regime. But governments in developing countries
have had ample time to put the administrative capacity in place and to
move it up the learning curve. The more likely explanation for poor
revenue performance is that countries either are quite satisfied with low
levels of public services and infrastructure, or that political leaders are
not willing to address the tough enforcement decisions required, including dealing harshly with corruption and evasion.
Another shade of this problem is bureaucratic politics, i.e., the internal
hassling that can slow or stop desirable fiscal measures. Tanzi (1987,
p. 234) recites a good example: “in one country the recommendation to
reduce the role of excise taxes and to expand that of broader taxes was
blocked mainly because the head of the excise department would lose
power as a consequence of loss of personnel assigned to these taxes.”
Everyone working in taxation can recite similar stories. We cannot
calculate the costs of bureaucratic politics, but enough anecdotes like
Tanzi’s might add up to a serious problem.
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CONCLUSIONS
On average, the tax revenue share of GDP in developing countries has not
increased substantially since the 1970s. Whatever revenue enhancement
advantages there were in the structural changes that did take place – the
adoption of the value added tax and the decreased reliance on customs
duties – were weakened by measures that narrowed the tax base. The
estimate here is that the average tax ratio was 14.8 percent for the 1970s,
and 16 percent for the 2000s.
One scenario for the next decade is that countries will continue to
muddle through, i.e., the combination of automatic and discretionary
revenue growth will be just large enough to keep pace with the growth in
GDP. The implication of this future is that government expenditures will
be held to an income elasticity of about unity. As in the past forty years,
some countries will exceed this growth in tax revenues and some will fall
short of it. The most important thing to note about this scenario is that it
does not allow the uptick in revenues necessary to finance the growing
infrastructure and public servicing gap. If historical trends are extrapolated, the target suggested by the United Nations to meet millennium
development goals – an increase in tax revenues equivalent to 4 percent
of GDP – will not be reached until the 2040s.
Another scenario is that developing countries will respond to growing
expenditure needs and ratchet up their tax efforts considerably. The target
suggested by the United Nations to meet millennium development goals
is ambitious but within the reach of many countries over the next decade.
To reach this level, a strategy of structural reforms that involve base
broadening, administrative improvements, and revenue decentralization
could both generate much of the needed revenue while increasing the
efficiency and fairness of the tax regimes.
As in the past four decades, the biggest roadblock to increased revenue
mobilization in developing countries will be the unwillingness of governments to make the difficult political decisions necessary to improve
taxation. A displacement in the thinking about the need to put in place a
more revenue productive tax system must come out of the political
process, and more specifically, must reflect a change in thinking on the
part of political leaders who come to believe that higher taxes to fund
infrastructure and services will lead to a higher rate of economic growth.
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1. I am grateful to Musharraf Cyan for helpful comments and to Pushkaraj
Savangaonkar for research assistance.
2. See also Bahl (2006) and Bahl and Bird (2008a) which lay the groundwork for this
analysis.
3. Some authors have offered opinions about the right level of taxation, based mostly on
personal experiences and hunches, and to some extent on historical data. Kaldor
speculated that 25 percent of GDP would be about right, but Martin and Lewis
(1956) placed the target level at about the current level, 17–19 percent of GDP.
4. For each decade, we compute the arithmetic mean of the tax ratio, ignoring all years
where data are not reported. The IMF (2011) used medians to correct for this.
Martinez-Vazquez et al. (2011) used five year moving averages to do time series
comparisons. Decade averages have the advantage of taking the longer view of the
trend in tax performance, but they miss the upward and downward movements within
a decade.
5. Because of an absence of data, or incomparability in the data, we dropped 17
countries from the analysis. Clearly the choice of countries included in the sample
can make a difference in these results. Chelliah (1971) found that the average tax
ratio increased from 11.3 percent in 1953–55 to 13.8 percent in 1966–68. Only 8 in
his sample of 27 less developed countries showed a decrease in the tax ratio during
this period.
6. For a discussion of “Wagner’s Law”, which in fact was not very precisely described
by Wagner, see Peacock and Wiseman (1961).
7. For discussion of various tax reform projects during this period, see Thirsk (1991),
Tanzi (1987a) and Harberger (1989). Some of the country studies include Indonesia
(Gillis, 1989), Jamaica (Bahl, 1991, and Bahl and Wallace, 2007), South Africa
(South African National Treasury), and Colombia (McLure and Zodrow, 1997; Bird,
Poterba and Slemrod, 2005, Musgrave and Gillis, 1971).
8. The Fiscal Affairs Department of the International Monetary Fund has been the most
prominent in this area. In 2011 alone they reported 35 headquarters-led missions on
tax policy issues and 61 in revenue administration (IMF, 2011, p. 46).
9. This literature is reviewed in Martinez-Vazquez et al. (2011).
10. Sometimes, more questionable practices are also copied, e.g., “keep your VAT
payment receipts to receive some form of tax credit reward”, improve tax compliance
by giving amnesties, or tax bank deposits.
11. For a good discussion of indirect taxes at this stage of development, see Due (1970).
12. In this update, I use the IMF dis-aggregation of taxes: taxes on income, profits and
capital gains; taxes on goods and services; and taxes on international trade. The
computations discussed here are mine, based on GFS data, and those made by Tanzi
(2011), Martinez-Vazquez et al. (2011), and IMF (2011). An important caveat to
interpreting these results (when based on IMF data) is that the decade averages for
the 1970s and 1980s are not comparable with those for the 1990s and 2000s, because
of changes in the GFS classification of taxes. Within the comparable twenty year
periods (1970s to 1990, and 1990s to 2000s), however, we can pull out some
patterns.
13. For an interesting tracking and interpretation of changes in the mix of taxes in
industrial countries, using OECD data, see Tanzi (2011).
14. For a good discussion of the VAT in practice in developing countries, see Bird and
Gendron (2007).
15. For overviews of the current state of tax administration in developing countries, see
Bird (2011) and IMF (2011).
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16. Bird and Gendron (2007, pp. 126–129) give a number of examples – school bags,
noodle soup in aluminum cans, basketballs – and emphasize the burden this places on
the tax administration.
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